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[Crim. No. 7213. In Bank. Dec. 3, 1963.] 
In re PAUL KERN IMBLER on Habeas Corpus. 
[1] Habeas Corpus-Grounds-Evidence-Knowing Use of Per-
jured TestimonY.-A judglllellt of conviction based on testi-
mony known by representatives of the state to be perjured 
deprives defendant of due process of law and lllay be at-
tacked on habeas corpus. ---
[2] Id.-Hearing-Burden of Proof.-In attacking on habeas 
corpus a jUdgment of conviction allegedly ba5ed on testi-
mony known by state representatives to be perjured, petition-
er must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that 
perjured testimony was adduced at his trial, that representa-
tives of the state knew that it was perjured, and that such 
testimony lllay have affected the outcome of the trial. 
[3] Id.-Hearing-Evidence.-On a rrference hearing of a peti-
tion for habeas corpus on the ground that petitioner was con-
victed on the basis of perjured testimony knowingly used by 
the state, the pertinent inquiry is whether the witness testi-
fied at the trial contrary to his belief at that time; that the 
witness, who identified petitioner at the preliminary hearing 
and at the trial, testified at the reference hearing that he could 
not then idf'ntify petitioner as the one who cOllllllitted the 
crime does not show perjury, but merely that the witness 
changed his mind. 
[4] Id.-Hearing-Evidence.-On petition for habeas corpus on 
thl' ground that a petitioner's conviction was obtained by the 
(1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Habeas Corpus, § 38; Am.Jur., Habeas Cor-
pus (1st ('Ii § 53). 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 6-9, 13, 14] Haheas Corpus, § 26; 
[2] Habeas Corpus, § 60; [3-5,10,12,16] Habeas Corpus, § 62.1; 
[11] Criminal Law, § 104; [HiJ Criminal Law, § 602; [17] Crim-
inal L.,w, § 1038(6); [18J Crilllinal Law, § 1038(1); [19] Crim-
iPlil Law, § 107; [20] Habens Corpu!';, § 11. 
) 
Dec. 1963] IN RE blBLER 555 
[vO C.~J 554; ;:.) CaI.Rp~r. ~U~, ~S'j" r.::!d 6] 
knowing use of perjured testimony, dt'spite a witness' claim 
at the habeas corpus rCferE'llCe hearing that he always had 
grave doubts about his identification of petitioner, a finding 
that the witness had neither before the trial nor after ex-
pressed to a stntc representative doubt as to his identification 
was supported by evidence that more than a year after the tI'ial 
and several months before the reference hearing the witness 
stated to police officers that he had had no doubt as to his iden-
tification at the time of the trial and had not perjured hilllself, 
and by testiIllony and ailidlwits of police offic<!rs and lIlt'll\-
bers of the district attorncy's staff denying that the wituess 
had expressed to them any doubt about his identifieatiun 
testimony. 
[5] Id.-Hearing-Evidence.-On a reference hearing of .a peti-
tion for habeas corpus on thc ground that a conviction was ob-
tained by the knowing use of perjured testimony, there W!1S 
support for a finding that the witness who allegedly gave 
the perjured tcstimony was not induced by any l't'presenta-
tive of the state to make a false identification of defendllllt 
by being shown photographs of defendant many times be-
fore the lineup at which defendant was identified where the 
evideuc.e showed that the witness was confused about the 
time when he saw defendant's photograph and the form of 
the photograph, it appearing that the photograph was not 
shown to the wHlll'ss until after he had described defl'ndant 
while helping the police make a eomposite drawing of the 
persoll suspected of committing the crime. 
[6a, 6b] Id.-Grounds-Evidence--Knowing Use of Perjured Tes-
timony.-Although a witness testified on cross-examination 
that he had only one prior felony conviction, whereas his 
"make sheet" showed that he had two felony convictions, and 
on redirect, to rehabilitate himself after cross-examination· 
about his commitment to state mental hospitals, testificd 
falsely that he had received dcgrees from two universities, 
such false statements did not require that defendant's con-
viction be overturned on habeas corpus where there was no 
proof that representatives of the state had knowledge of the 
falsehoods. 
[7] Id.-Grounds-Evidence--Knowing Use of False Testimony.-
False testimony affecting a witness' credibility is perjured 
if willfully given, and such testimony would require that a 
conviction be overturned if representatives of the state had 
knowledge of its false nature and if it might have affected the 
outeome. of the trial. 
[8a,8b] Id.-Grounds-Evidence--Knowing Use of Perjured Tes-
timony.-Thnt a fingerprint expert testified incorrectly at 
defendant's trial as to the numbcl' of fingerprints on a razor 
) 
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calle and their sulliciency for idcntilication purposes did not 
require that defendnnt's cOllviction be ovcrthrown on habeas 
corpus where thcre was no indication that the cxpert intl>n-
tionally gave false testimony; honest error in expl'rt opiniou 
is not perjury even though furthcr diligencc nnd study might 
have revealed the error. 
[9] Id.-Grounds-Evidence-Knowing Use of Perjured Testi-
mony.-If any representative of the state connected with a 
prosecution either gives perjured testimony or knows that 
other prosecution witnesses have pcrjured themselves, a 
writ of habeas corpus will issue. It is immaterinl that the 
prosecutor himself did not have knowledge of the perjury. 
(10} Id.-Rearing-Evidence.-In a habeas corpus proceeding 
on the ground that a conviction was obtained by the knowing 
use of perjured testimony, even nssuming that a fingerprint 
expert was negligent in analyzing the fingerprints on a razor 
case and in testifying that they were too fragmentary to 
identify, there was no basis for the issuance of a writ of 
habeas corpus where the razor case nnd the fingerprints on 
it were available to defendant throughout the trial for his 
own examination, where proof that someone else handled the 
case would not have absolved defendant or conflicted with 
the evidence against him, and where the testimony of the 
expert did not interfere with the presentation of defendant's 
defense. 
[11] Criminal Law-Rights of Accused-Fair Trial.-Suppression 
by the state of material evwence alone deprives a defendant 
of due process of law. 
[12] Rabeas Corpus-Rearing-Evidence.-On a reference hear-
ing of a petition for habeas corpus on the ground that a 
conviction was obtained by the knowing use of perjured testi-
mony, a clnim that the police prevented the appearnnce at 
the trial of a witness favorable to defendant was not sup-
ported by the evidence where it appeared that unusual dili-
gence was exercised by representatives of the state to procure 
the attendance of the witness, that at the time of the trial 
the police testified that they were unable to locate the witness 
after a thorough search, and that the assumption that the 
witness would have been favorable to defendant was doubtful 
in light of a card signed by the witness at a police lineup 
identifying defendant as the person who committed the crime. 
[13] Id.-Grounds-Evidence-Suppression of Evidence.-Sup-
pression of the fact that a coemployee of defendant was un-
able to identify the coat dropped by the person who com-
mitted the crime was not sufficient to require that defendant's 
conviction be overturned on habeas corpus where the failure 
to identify the coat was merely one of mnny fruitless at-
tempts to connect defendant with the physical evidence in 
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the case j evidence of such failures would have been merely 
negative evidence of little probative value and could not 
have affected the outcome of the case. 
[14] ld.-Grounds-Evidence-Suppression of Evidence.-Suppres-
sion of the fact that investigating police knew that a witness 
against defendant had issued several checks that were re-
turned between the commi5sion of the crime charged against 
defendant and the trial did not require that defendant's con-
viction be overturned on habeas corpus where it appeared 
that the police did not consider the information significant, 
no charges were made or proposed because of the issuance 
of the checks, and neither before nor at the trial did defend-
ant request diseovery of such evidence. 
[15] Criminal Law-Conduct of Counsel-Reception of Evidence-
Suppression of Evidence.-Although representatives of the 
state may not suppress substantial material evidence, they 
are under no duty to report sua sponte to defendant all that 
they learn about the case and about their witnesses. 
[16] Habeas Corpus-Hearing-Evidence.-In a habeas corpus 
proceeding, new evidence presented to the referee, including 
testimony at the reference hearing by a prosecution witness 
at the trial that defendant was not the man he chased after 
the crime and the presentation at the reference hearing of 
several witnesses who corroborated defendant's alibi defenses, 
did not undermine the prosecution's entire case against de-
fendant where it did not point unerringly to defendant's 
innocence, but presented only a conflict with the evidence 
that was before the jury and afforded only a basis for specu-: 
lation or conjecture. ' 
[17] Criminal Law-Judgment-Writ of Error Coram Vobis.-The 
writ of coram vobis is essentially identical to the writ of coram 
nobis except that the latter is addressed to the court in which 
the petitioner was convictl'd. 
[18] ld.-Judgment-Writ of Error Coram Vobis.-Wl'its of cor-
am 'l'obis and coram nobis will be granted only if petitioner 
can show that some fact existed which, without any fault or 
negligence on his part, was not presented to the court at the 
trial on the merits, and which if presented would have pre-
vented the judgment. 
[19] ld.-Rights of Accused-Aid of Counsel.-Defendant was 
not denied adequate representation by counsel on the ground 
that there was an absence of an effective investigation in hiE 
[17] See Cal.Jur.2d, Coram ~obis, § 2. 
[19] See Cal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 146 et seq.; Am.Jur., Crim, 
inal Law (1st ed § 167 et seq). 
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behalf, despite the fact that an iuvestigation after the trial 
by the Adult Authority and the district attorney's staff turned 
up additional alibi witnesses the defense had been unable to 
find, where the services of the public defender's investigative 
staff were available to defendant and an investigator worked 
on the case, and where defense counsel did not indicate dur-
ing the trial that additional investigative services were need-
ed or ask for additional time to conduct an investigation. 
Whatever may be the scope of the right to adequate and effec-
tive investigation, it does not require that the investigation 
produce all evidence that can be shown by hindsight to have 
been available. 
[20] Habeas Corpus-Grounds-Errors and Irregularities.-On a 
reference hearing of a petition for habeas corpus to secure 
release from custody after a conviction of first degree mur-
der, the petitioner could not successfully claim that the trial 
judge erred in informing the jury, in response to a juror's 
question, of petitioner's right to an automatic appeal to the 
Supreme Court in the event they should impose a death pen-
alty, and in failing to admonish the jury of their sole re-
sponsibility for imposing sentence and to explain to them 
the nature and scope of the Supreme Court's review, where 
the jury were informed of the automatic appeul only after 
consent of both parties had been obtained, and objection to 
the judge's statelllent was not raised eithl'r at the trial or on 
the appeal. 
PROCEEDING in habeas corpus to secure rE'leasE' from cus- I 
tody, or for a writ of error coram vobis, or other appropriate I 
rE'lief. Order to show cause dischargE'd and petition denied. I 
Gregory S. Stout, Charles Hollopeter, Warren hEttinger, 
Albert C. Garber, Ellery E. Cuff, Public DefE'nder (Los 
Angeles), Richard S. Buckley, De~uty Public Defender, 
Jules C. Goldstone and Low & Stone for Petitioner. 
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, John S. McInerny and 
AlbE'rt \V. Harris, Jr., Deputy Attorneys General, \Villiam B. 
MeKpsson, District Attorney (Los Angeles), and Harry 
Wood, Deputy District Attorney, for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Petitioner was convicted of first degree 
JIlurder and of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to 
commit murder. The jury fixed his penalty a~ death. This 
court affirmed the judgment and an order denying a motion 
for new trial. (People v. Imble.r, 57 Cal.2d 711 [21 Cal.Rptr. 
56R, 371 P.~d 304].) In this proceeding, pet.itioner s('eks a 
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On January 4, 1961, two men entered a I,os Angeles 
market, one of them shot and fatally wounded Morris Has-
son, the proprietor, and they departed in different directions. 
The only eyewitness to the crime, Hasson's wife, was unable 
to identify the man who did the shooting, but later identified 
his accomplice. A passerby, Alfred Costello, ran toward the 
market when he heard the shot, and at the lighted entrance 
t'l1countered a man leaving the store with a gun in his lland. I 
Costello chased the killer through several parking lots adja- i 
cent to the store; the killer shot at Costello and dropped llis : 
hat aIH} coat while making his escape. A pistol, later identi-
fied as the murder weapon, a razor in a plastic ease, and a 
soiled hanclerchief were in the coat. 
Entirely ou the basis of the idelltifieation testimony of sev-
eral witnesses, petitioner was cOllvicted of murdering Hasson 
in the perpetration of an armed robbery and of assault with 
intent to murder Costello. All attempts to tie the physical 
evidence at the scene of the murder to petitioner were 
fruitless, and a police expert testified that fingerprints ou the 
murder weapon and on the razor and its case were too frag-
mentary to assign to anyone. Petitioner was identified as the 
man who left the store with a gun by Costello, who had seen 
the killer at the entrance of the store and again during the, 
chase, by Billy Hillen, who was leaving the store as the two: 
men entered and who testified that he had clearly seen them 
again as they left, and by Alonzo Duulap, who was an 
attendant at one of the parking lots through which the killer 
escaped. Hillen and Mrs. Hasson identified the other man at 
the killing as Leonard Lingo, an accomplice of petitioner in 
an attempted robbery in Pomona on January 14, 1961. Dur-
ing this January 14 attempt, Lingo was killed and another 
accomplice, Jerry Mayes, was captured. On January 15, 
Imbler surrendered to the Pomona police. 
Petitioner testified that he first met Lingo, whose identity 
as the accomplice of the killer was not disputed, on the morn-
ing of January 14 and that he spent thc evening of January 
4 with several other persons in various Los Angeles bars. 
Both alibis were corroborated by Mayes, his accomplice in the 
January 14 robbery attempt. 
The petition allE'gE's that the prosecution secured petition-
er's conviction through the knowing use of perjured testi-
mony and that newly discovered evidence completely under-
mines the entire strueture of the ease 011 which the prosecu-
tion was based. After examining the petition and the affida-
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vits attached to it, wc issued an order to show cause and 
appointed the Honorable Thomas P. 'Yhite, retired Associate 
Justice of this court, as referee to take evidl'nce directed to 
the following questions: 
"1. Did any witness who testified against Paul Kern 
Imbler in thc trial which r('sult('d in the judgment of convic-
tion, affirmed by this court in People v. Imbler, 57 A.C. 757 
[57 Ca1.2d 711 (2 Cal.Rptr. 568, 371 P.2d 304)], commit 
perjury as defined in the Pellal Code of the State of Cali-
fornia T 
"2. In the event that any witness did commit perjury, did 
any representative of the State of California cause or sutler 
such testimony to be introduced, knowing such testimony as 
given was perjured! 
,. 3. Did any representative of the State of California sup-
press or prevent the introduction of any evidence which, had 
it been given, would have been favorable to the defense of 
Paul Kern Imbler! 
"4. What if any ncw evidence has been discovered that 
undermines the case presented by the prosecution at the time 
of the judgment of conviction of Paul Kern Imbler Y" 
[1] A judgment of conviction based on testimony known 
by representatives of the state to be perjured deprives the 
defendant of due process of la,v (Mooney v. Holohan, 294 
U.S. 103, 112-113 [55 S.Ct. 340, 79 L.Ed. 791, 98 A.L.R. 
406] ; Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 216 (63 S.Ct. 177, 87 
L.Ed. 214]) and may be attacked on habeas corpus (In re 
Mooney, 10 Ca1.2d 1, 15 [73 P.2d 554]; In re Lindley, 29 
Ca1.2d 709, 722 [177 P.2d 918] ; In re Horowitz, 33 Ca1.2d 
534, 537 [203 P.2d 513]). [2] In making such an attack, 
. however, petitioner must establish by a preponderance of the 
evidence that perjured testimony was adduced at his trial, 
that representatives of the state knew that it was perjured 
(In re Mooney, supra, at p. 15; In re Lindley, supra, at p. 
722), and that such testimony may have affected the outcome 
of the trial (Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 272 [79 S.Ct. 
1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217, 1222-1223]; see In re De La Roi, 27 
Ca1.2d 354, 365 [164 P.2d 10] ; In re Mitchell, 35 Ca1.2d 849, 
R56 [221 P.2d 689]). 
[3] Petitioner alleges several instances of knowing use of 
perjured trstimollY. He first attacks Costello's identification 
t('stimony. At the preliminary hearing and at the trial, Costel-
lo identified petitioner as the man he ehased, but when asked 
at the reference hearing if petitioner was that man, he testi-
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fied that" at this time I will have to say no." This change in 
testimony alone does not constitute perjury, but merely indi-
cates that Costello changed his mind. The pertinent inquiry 
is whether he testified at the trial contrary to his belief at 
that time. (See People v. Von Tiedeman, 120 Cal. 128, 134-
137 [52 P. 155].) 
[4] More than a year after the trial and several months 
before the reference hearing, Costello was interviewed by the 
police. A tape recording of that interview (the accuracy of 
which was challenged by Costello) disclosed that when asked 
if he had any doubts about his identification of petitioner at 
the trial, he answered: "No at that time there was no doubt . 
. .. I'm not worried about pcrjury because I don't think I 
perjured myself. I answered the question to the best of my 
knowledge and recollection." At the hearing, however, Cos-
tello claimed that he always had grave doubts about his iden-
tification. The referee found that he "testified of his own free 
will as to such identification based upon his own knowledge 
as disclosed by his tE'stimony at both the preliminary exam-
ination and the trial of Petitioner in the Superior Court." 
At the reference hearing, Costello also testified that he had 
told the police that he was extremely reluctant to testify 
because of his doubts, but that they had forced him to testify 
by holding some bad check charges over him. This charge was 
categorically denied by the police officers involved although, 
they admitted having knowledge of several outstanding bad . 
checks issued by Costello and of his previous convictions for 
issuing such checks. The referee found that the record "re-
flects definitrly that 110 threats of any character were made to 
Costello with regard to the aforesaid worthless checks." Cos-
tello also testified that he had expressed doubt ahout his 
identification, both before and after the trial, to at least 16 
state officials, including members of the Los Ang-rles Police 
Department, members of the Vernon Police Department, 
members of the staff of the Los Angeles District Attorney, 
and two judges of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 
County. Testimony and affidaYits from these persons uni-
formly denied that Costello expressed such doubts to them. 
In fact, some of them stated that he seE'med quite certain and 
unshakable in his identification of petitioner. The prosecu-
ting attorney and a police officer testified that they talhd to 
Costello before he testified at the trial to impress upon him 
the seriousness of his identification and to tell him that thl're 
would be no disgrace in withdrawing it if he were unsure. 
-) 
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Costello replied: " 'I'm positiw. I know it's serious to be 
wrong. I haye b('cn c011\'iet('<1 lIIysl'lf of a felony, so I know 
how serious it is. I'm pt\siti\'e in my identification.'" The 
referee found "that at 110 time dthcr before or after the trial 
of Petitioner Imbler on the charge of murder, which resulted 
in his eonviction, did the witness .Alfred Costello express to 
any repr('s(,lltative of the State of California a doubt as to 
his identification of Petitioner Imbler as testified by the 
witness Costello." 
We adopt both of these findings involving Costello's all('g-
edly perjured identification. Although we are not bound h.v 
the findings of a referee (In re Mooney, 10 Ca1.2d 1, 17 [73 
P.2d 554]), they are entitled to great weight (In re Riddle, 
57 Ca1.2d 848, 853 [22 Cal. Rptr. 472, 372 P.2d 304] ; In re 
ltlartinez, 52 Ca1.2d 808, 812 [345 P.2d 449] ; In re Mitchell, 
35 Ca1.2d 849, 855 [221 P.2d 689]). After a full hearing, the 
referee disbelieved most, if not all, of the ehallgrs that Co!'!-
tello made in Ilis trial testimony and the charges he made at 
the reft'rencl' lll'aring. He found "that the testimony given 
by said Alfred J. Costello at the Reference Hearing, which 
\'8ri('<1 from his t('stimony at the murder trial, was thoron~h-
1;V impeached and discredited by numerous witnesses, wlli1e 
the t('stimoll~' of said Alfred J. Costello, as given at the 1111ll"-
der trial coneerning his identification of Petitioner is corrob-
orated by the testimony of witnesses Billy Hillen and 
Alonzo Duulap. and is consistent ,vith other circumstances in 
thl' (·ast' .... " The referee had the opportunity to obs('rw t},(' 
witness and judge his credibility and demeanor. (Se>e In TC 
Dc La Roi, 27 Cal.2d 354, 364 [164 P.2d 10] ; In re Mart·ir!>, 
27 Ca1.2d 503, 516 [165 P.2d 241].) The transcript of the 
)waring rewals many ambiguities and inconsistencies in Cns-
tello's testimony that convince us that the referee was fully 
justified in making this finding. 
[5] Petitioner alleges that Costello perjured himse 1£ 
when questioned about seeing photographs of petitioner. co~­
tell0 testified at the reference hearing that petitioner's mug 
shot was shown to him many times before the lineup wl1<'l·e 
petitioner was identified, and "as I recollect back, there was 
a little psYCllOlogy that they uscd on me by showing In(, tl,,! 
picture continuously. The image of Imbler, naturally, became 
imbedded in my mind, and when I saw the man in the lilH'-
up, it was a recollection of the picture not of the man that 
had el1tprpd the store. It was a little psychologoy that tlll'~' 
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r,'fcrrnre hrnring that h(' slHHwd the photograph of petition-
er from the Los Angell's Police D('partment files once to all of 
the witnrsses before the lineup. lIe pres('uted it with photo-
graphs of about a dozen similar-looking men, and each of the 
witnesses identified petitioner's photograph as that of the 
killer. 
Costello's position on this point is not clear. At the trial, 
he first stated upon cross-examination that he l1ad not seen 
any mug shots of petitioner before the lineup; after further 
questioning, he stated that he was "not positive, but cer-
tain" that he had seen mug shots of petitioner in a mug 
book before the lineup, but that he had kept his identification 
to himself. At the reference hearing, Costello presented a 
third version of the facts; he claimed that the police showed 
mug shots of petitioner to him several times before he helped 
in making the composite drawing of the killer, which closely 
resembled petitioner and was admitted into evidence at the 
trial. 
The police denied showing any photographs of petitioner 
to Costello before the drawing was completed. The composite 
drawing was completed on January 18, 1961, and the Los 
Angeles Police Department's files show that petitioner's file, 
which presumably contained his photograph, was not released 
to officers investigating the Hasson murder until January 25. 
Costello testified that some of the mug shots he was shown , 
were taken by the Pomona police when petitioner turned 
himself in for the January 14 robbery attempt, but the 
Pomona photographs were not taken until January 17, and 
the investigating officer from the Los Angeles Police Depart-
ment testified that he did not receive them until January 20 
and never showed them to any of the witnesses. Moreover, it 
appears that petitioner first came to the attention of the Los 
Angell's police as a suspect whcn an officer who had talked to 
him when he turned himself in for the Pomona robbery saw a 
resemblance between him and the completed composite draw-
ing. It therefore appears that petitioner's photograph was 
not shown to Costello before the composite drawing was 
made.1 
IAn officer of the Vernon Police Department, called by the State to 
demonstrate Costello's certainty as to his id~nt.ifir.ation, testified tli:tt 
between January 10 and January 15, 1961, Costcllo told him that he 
"was able to sclect one pifture of an individual who was the sll"peet or 
who did the shooting in this particular case" and thnt he "was very 
Bure about it." In light of all of the contrary evidence, howe\"cr, the 
) 
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The referee found that "the witness Alfred J. Costello 
was not induced by any representative of the State of Cali. 
fornia to unwittingly or otlwrwise make a false identification 
of Petitioner Imbler .... " The evidence supports this find. 
ing and fails to establish that Costello wilfully gave false 
testimony at the trial about seeing petitioner's photograph. 
His testimony at the reference hearing shows that he was 
confused about when he saw a photograph of petitioner and 
the form of that photograph. In any event, Costello's testi-
mony at the trial apprised the jury that he may have been 
"preconditioned" to identify petitioner at the lineup. 
(Compare Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 270-271 [79 S.Ct. 
1173,3 L.Ed.2d 1217, 1221-1222].) 
[6a] Petitioner also alleges that several times Costello 
perjured himself in answering questions involving his credi-
bility. At the trial, Costello was cross-examined about his 
criminal record and testified that he had only one felony 
conviction; his "make sheet," introduced at the reference 
hearing, showed that in fact he had two felony cOllvictions. 
Costello was also cross-examined about his commitment to 
state mental hospitals. On redirect examination, he attempted 
to rehabilitate himself by testifying that since the time of his 
release from these hospitals, he had received degrees from the 
University of California (completing a four-year course in 
two years) and the University of Southern California 
(receiving an "Engineer's Degree"). This statement was 
established as false at the reference hearing. 
[7] False testimony affecting a witness's credibility is 
perjured if willfully given (People v. Barry, 63 Cal. 62, 64-
65; People v. Lem You, 97 Cal. 224, 226-227 [32 P. 11]; 
People v. Low Ying, 20 Cal.App.2d 39, 42-43 [66 P.2d 211] ),2 
witness was probably confused as to the date, for he had previously 
testified that he did not know the date of this conversation because of 
Costello's frequent visits. 
2As to Costello's trial testimony regarding his colll'ge etlul'ation, the 
referee found "that the foregoing false testimony does not constitute 
perjury as defined by the Penal Code of the State of California (§§ 118, 
125) in that said testimony was not given as to any fact material to the 
essential issues iJlYolved in the trial of Petitioner Imbler." (~o finding 
was made as to Costello's trial testimony regarding the number of his 
felony convictions.) False testimony concernir.g the credibility of a wit-
nesll is material, however, and may be the basis of a conviction for 
perjury. (People v. Barry, supra; People v. Lem You, supra; People v. 
Low Yi1lg, supra.) Arguably, Costello's educational achievements are 
technieally immaterial to show rehabilitation from insanity, but in a 
perjury case, "the ordinary test of materiality is whether the testimon1 
) 
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and such testimony would require that the conviction be 
overturned if repres(>lltntives of the state had knowledge of 
its false nature and if it might have affected the outcome of 
the trial (see Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269-270 [79 
S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217]; People v. Savvidcs, 1 N.Y.2d 
554,557 [154 N.Y.S.2d 885,136 N.E.2d 853]). [6b] Petition-
er, however, failed to prove knowledge of these falsehoods by 
representatives of the state. No evidence was introduced at the 
reference hearing to show that any person connected with the 
prosecution knew of Costello's educational background. The 
prosecutor examined him about his college degrees on redi-
rect examination only because Costello had informed him 
that he had several degrees during a recess immediately after I 
the cross-examination. The prosecutor had no reason to disbe- ! 
lieve this information, which was first given to him during 
the course of the trial, and he had no duty to verify it before 
using it to rehabilitate his witness. (See In re Horowitz, 33 
Ca1.2d 534, 540 [203 P.2d 513].) Petitioner contends that the 
prosecutor had Costello's "make sheet," which listed all of 
his prior convictions, before him at the trial. The referee 
found, however, that petitioner's counsel had the same 
"make sheet" in his possession during the trial, yet failed to 
use it to correct the false testimony. If the prosecutor is to be 
charged with knowledge of the contents of the "make 
sheet." so must petitioner. (Sce In re Manchestel', 33 Ca1.2d· 
740, 742 [204 P.2d 881]; Taylor v. United States, 229 F.2d 
826, 833-834; Green v. United States, 158 F.Supp. 804, 809; 
cf. People v. Adam.~on, 34 Ca1.2d 320, 329 [210 P.2d 13] ; In 
re lIlitchell, 35 Ca1.2d 849,856 [221 P.2d 689].)8 
given could ha ... e pro1.ably influenced the tribunal before which the cause 
was being tried .... " (People v. Barry, 153 Cal.App.2d 193, 209 [314 
P.2d 531]: accord People v. Di Giacomo, 193 Cal.App.2u 688, 699·700 
[14 Cal.Rptr. 574]; People v. Macken, 32 Cal.App.2d 31, 41 [89 P.2d 
173]; People v. Dunstan, 59 Cal.App. 574, 58-1 [211 P. 813].) This 
testimony" could have prohn bl~- influenced" the jury to consider Costel-
lo rehabilitated after his capacity and competellce as a witness had been 
put into question on cross-examination. 
3Petitioncr also contends that Costello perjured himself on redirect 
examination when he testified that his commitment to state mental hos· 
pitals was "voluntary." It was established at the reference hearing 
that he waE committed under section 1026 of the Penal Code when he 
was found not guilty of a criminal eha rge by reason of insanity. Thus, 
petitioner argues that the commitment was not voluntary. At the trial, 
however, Costello apparently only meant that he voluntarily pleaded not 
guilty by reason of insanity. 'rhe following question and answer appear 
in the redirect examination of Costello: 
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[Sa] Petitioncr cOJltcllds that the testimony given by the 
police fingerprint expert at the trial was perjured. [9] If 
any representative of the state connected with the prosecu-
tion either gives perjured testimony or knows that other 
prosecution witnesses have perjured themsclYes, the writ will 
issue. It is immaterial that the prosecuting attorney himself 
did not have knowledge of the pcrjnry. (Curran v. Delaware, 
259 F.2d 707, 713; see In Te De La Roi, 27 Ca1.2d 354 [164 
P.2d 10] ; In Te De La Roi, 28 Ca1.2d 264 [169 P.2d 363]; 
PyZe v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 [63 S.Ct. 177, 87 L.Ed. 214] ; cf. 
In Te Mitchell, 35 Ca1.2d 849, 855 [221 P.2d 689]. But see In 
re Allen, 47 Ca1.2d 55, 59-60 [301 P .2d 577]. Compare Brady 
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87-88 [83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 
215,218].) 
[Sb] '1'he expert testified at the trial that t11ere were two i 
fingerprint fragments on the plastic razor case found in the: 
pocket of the coat dropped by the killer and that Iwither was 
sufficiently well defined to be assigned to anyone. At the ref-
erence 11earing, an expert produced by petitioner tpstificd 
that there were three fingerprints on the razor case and that 
although two were too fragmentary to identify, the third 
could be identified and was definitely not petitioner's. The 
police expert at the refercnce hearing at first testifiNl that 
there were only two fingerprints on the case. Upon examining 
his photographs of the fingerprints, he corrected himself and 
stated that there were three. He repeatNl a~ai!l that all W\'1',' 
insufficient to identify. After being instructed on cross-exam-
ination to examine his photographs overnight, however, he 
admitted the ncxt day that olle could be idelltifit·d alltl that it 
was not petitioner's. 
There is certainly an inconsistrncy in this pros('(mtioJl wit-
ness's testimony at the reference hearing, but it appf'ars that 
he first came to the eonclusion tllat one of the fingerprints on 
the razor case could be identified as not being petitioner's 
during a l'l'C('SS in the hearing itself. There is no indieation 
that he intentionally gave false testimony at the trial as to 
the number of fingerprints or as to whether they were identi-
"Q. And what were the circumstances of your voluntarily committing 
yourself' 
"A. Well, in '46 and '47 when I was committed to Mendocino, I got 
in a little trouhle with the law and I was represented by the Puhlic 
Defender's Offiee at that time, and it was suggested to me that I enter 
/I. plea of not rcn~onnhly-not guilty by reason of insanity, and I ,ya~ 
furnished a copy with the right answers to give the doctors at that time, 
which rauseu me to be committe(l to Mendocino." 
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fiable. An honest error in expert opinion is not perjnry eyen 
though further diligence and study might have rl'vealt'd the 
(·rror. (See In re lIoll·ell. 114 Cal. 230, :?:i4 I .. W 1'. l:i!l'; 
People v. Von Tiedeman, 120 Cal. 128, 136-1:17 [52 P. 133]; 
In re Lindley, 29 Ca1.2d 709, 723 [177 P.2d !H8J.) 
[10] Petitioner contends, however, that the fingerprint \ 
expert was negligent in analyzing the fingerprints and in: 
testifying that they were too fragmentary to identify .. He 
asserts that we should now recognize that the negligent pre-
sentation of false testimony is as damaging as the knowing 
use of perjured testimony and that, therefore, the judgment 
should be set aside. The issue of the expert's negligence was 
not presented to ~he referee; even if we assume, however, 
that the expert wis negligent, his neglige nee did not depriyl' 
petitioner of a fair trial. We have no doubt that negligenc(' 
of representatives of the state in preparing and presentin'.! a 
criminal prosecution could in some cases result in a denial of 
a fair trial. (See People v. Kidd, 56 Cal.2d 7i)~'. 769-"il 11\; 
Cal.Rptr. 793, 366 P.2d 49] ; People v. Carter, 48 Ca12d 737. 
747 [312 P.2d 665]; United States v. Heath, 147 F_Snpp. 
877; ef. Kyle v. United States, 297 F.2d 507, 511; Um:terl 
States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 291 F.~d ;():~. i'i70-
571.) Police investigators, however, are not infallibh'. Ilnd it 
is the basic purpose of the trial to determine wl1etht'l' tIH'Y 
were correct in asserting the defendant's guilt. l7llh'ss 
their negligence has obstructed the defendant ill ehallenging 
the case against him, it is not a ground for collateral attack. 
The razor case and the fingl>rprints on it wt'r<' IlYailable to 
petitioner throughout the trial for his own examination. 
Moreover, proof that someOlI(' else had handled tll(' razor cas(' 
would not have absolved petitioner or conflieted with the 
evidence against him. The tt'stimony of the polic(' expl'rt did 
not interfere with the presentation of petitioner's defense, 
and had petitioner considered it Il(lvantngt'olls to prl'sent 
further fingerprint evidenct'. he could haw done so. 
Petitioner contends that in seYcl'al instant'''s the state sup-
pressed evidence favorable to him. Evidel1ce of suppression 
of material evidenc(' has llsually bl'(,11 cOlIsi(l('l'('d in connec-
tion with a claim that the state knowingly us('d pprjured 
testimony to secure a cOl1yiC'tinn. (In rc ;l/O()//I'l/, 10 Ca1.2d 1. 
15 [73 P.2d 5!i4]; In re Lindley. 20 Cal.2d i()!). 722 [177 
P.2d 918].) [U] ~I!)r(,o\"l'r, SIIP/ll'l'ssiol\ by t11t' shltt' of 
material evi(1l'lH'c 1111>11(' dl'pri,·l's a clpf\'!Hlallt of dllt' prflc('ss 
of law. (III t·c Raz/(ti.~, 35 Cal.2d [i:l2, il35 [21!J P.2d 15] j 
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Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 [83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed. 
2d 215, 218], affirming 226 Md. 422, 427 [174 A.2d 167]; 
United States ex reI. Almeida v. Baldi, 195 F.2d 815, 820 [33 
A.L.R.2d 1407].) [12] Petitioner contends that the police pre-
vented the appearance of one witness favorable to him and 
"quietly pushed" him out of Los Angeles before the trial. This 
witness, James Fritz, was standing near Billy Hillen when the 
killer rushed by, encouraged Hillen and Costello to stop him, 
and joined Costeno in chasing him, but he did not testify at 
either the preliminary hearing or the trial. The referee found 
that this contention "is utterly barren of evidentiary support 
in the record. I find that the record herein demonstrates that 
unusual diligence was exercised by the representative of the 
State of California to procure the attendance of Mr. Fritz as 
a witness at the murder trial of P('titioner Imbler." The 
police testified that at the tilne of trial, they were unable to 
locate Fritz after a thorough search, and no one has yet been 
able to find him. Moreover, petitioner's assumption that this 
witness would have been favorable to the defense is doubtful 
in light of the card introduced .at the hearing, signed by 
Fritz at the police lineup, identifying petitioner as the killer. 
[13] Petitioner contends that the police suppressed the 
fact that a co-employee of petitioner was unable to identify 
the coat dropped by the killer. This failure to identify the 
coat was merely one of many fruitless attempts to connect 
petitioner to the physical evidence in the. case. Evidence of 
these failures would have been merely negative evi-
dence of little probative value and could not have affectE'd the 
outcome of the casco (See Palakiko V. Harper, 209 F.2d 75, 
95; cf. United Statcs ex rel Thompson v. Dye, 221 F.2d 763, 
769 [concurring opinion).) 
[14] Petitioner contends that the state suppressed the 
fact that investigating police knew that Costello had issued 
several checks that were returned because of insufficient 
funds between the killing and the trial. The referee found, 
however, that "no threats of any cllaracter were made to 
Costello with regard to the aforesaid worthless checks." The 
evidence at the hearing shows that the police did not 
consider this information significant; no charges were made 
because of the issuance of these checks, and none were 
ever proposed. Neither before nor at the trial did p('titioner 
rt>quest discovery of any of the evidence he now claims was 
snpprt>ssed. (See Brady v. Marylalld, 3i3 U.S. 8:3 [8:1 
S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215]; cf. Unitra Statns v. Consoli· 
dated Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d 563; Kyle v. United States, 
) 
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297 F.2d 507.) [15] Although representatives of the state 
may not suppress substantial material evidence, they are 
under no duty to report sua sponte to the defendant all that 
they learn about the case and about their witnesses. 
[16] Petitioner contends that there is new evidence that 
undermines the prosecution's entire case. (See In I'e Lindley, 
29 Ca1.2d 709, 723 [177 P.2d 918] ; Jones v. Kentucky, 97 
F.2d 335, 338; cf. Durley v. Mayo, 351 U.S. 277, 291 [76 
S.Ct. 806, 100 L.Ed. 1178, 1188] [dissent].) Some of this new 
evidence has already been mentioned: Costello's testimony at 
the reference hearing that petitioner is not the man he chased 
and the new expert testimony that a fingerprint found among 
the personal effects of the killer is not petitioner's. Moreover, 
Costello cast doubt on the testimony of the prosecution's 
other witnesses by testifying that one of them was in no 
position to make an identification when he saw the killer and 
that the other was intoxicated. Petitioner also presented sey-
eral witnesses at the reference hearing to corroborate his alibi 
defenses. Two additional persons testified that petitioner first 
met Lingo, who was identified as one of the two men involved 
in the January 4 killing, on January 14; two additional wit-
nesses testified that they accompanied petitioner in making 
the rounds of various Los Angeles taverns on the night of the 
killing. , 
Much of this evidence was thoroughly discredited at the ! 
reference hearing. As to Costello's recanting, the referee: 
found "that while the testimony of the witness Alfred J .. 
Costello, given at the Reference Hearing, is ' ... impeached in 
so many ways as to defy lucid presentation' ... , his testi-
mony given at Petitioner's trial for murder is supported and 
corroborated. " Thus, Costello charged that Dunlap, the 
parking lot attendant who identified the killer at the trial, 
was so intoxicated at the time of the crime that he could not 
make an identification. This charge was rebutted by Dun-
lap's employer, who testified that he had never known this 
witness to drink on the job although he had checked the lot 
daily for three years, and by a police officer who testified that 
Dunlap did not appear to have been drinking when ques-
tioned on the scene. 
All of the witnesses who testified at the reference hearing 
that they were with petitioner on the night of the killing 
were shown on cross-examination to be uncertain of the exact 
date, and some of the witnesses who testified that petitioner 
first met Lingo on January 14 were impeached through prior 
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inconsistent statements. Moreover, the testimony supporting 
both of the alibis was merely cumulative to testimony at the 
trial, for both of petitioner's alibis were corroborated then', 
although by a close friend who was his accomplice in the 
January 14 robbery attempt. 
In In re Lindley, supra, 29 Ca1.2d 709, which also involved 
a conviction based entirely upon identification testimony, a 
new suspect was discovered after the trial and a former 
autopsy surgeon testified that the victim had died of a heart 
attack. We held that such new evidence did not justify relief, 
and the same concI llsion must be drawn here. In this case, as 
in Lindley, the new evidence "does not point unerringly to 
[petitioner's] innocence," but "presents only a conflict 
with the evidence which was before the jury" and "affords 
only a basis for speculation or conjecture." (29 Ca1.2d at p. 
724.) 
Nor can a writ of coram vobis, which petitioner seeks 
in the alternative, issue on the basis of this new evidence. 
[17] The writ of coram vobis is essentially identical to the 
writ of coram nobis except that the latter is addressed to the 
court in which the petitioner was convicted. (l n re Lind-
ley, 29 Ca1.2d 709,726 [177 P.2d 918].) [18] These writs 
will be granted only if petitioner can "show that some 
fact existed which, without any fault or negligence on his 
part, was not presented to the court at the trial on the mer-
its, and which if presented would have prevented the judg-
ment." (People v. iII endez, 28 Ca1.2d 686, 688 [171 P.2d 
425] ; accord, People v. Reid, 195 Cal. 249, 255 [232 P. 457, 
36 A.L.R. 1435] ; In re Lindley, sltpm, at p. 724-726; People 
v. Tuthill, 32 Ca1.2d 819, 821 [198 P.2d 505].) No such show-
ing has been made. 
[19] Petitioner contends that he was denied adequate 
representation by counsel because of the absence of an effec-
tive investigation in his behalf. (Compare In re Ochse, 38 
Ca1.2d 230, 231 [238 P.2d 561). See ~eJlcrally Note, Right to 
Aid in Addition to Oounsel for Indigent Or£minal Defend-
ants, 47 Minn.L.Rev. 1054.) The services of the Los Angeles 
Public Defender's investigative staff were available, however, 
and an investigator worked on the casf'. At no time during 
the trial did counsel indicate that additional investigative 
services were 11{'eded or ask for additional time to conduct all 
investigation. The only support for the claim that the inves-
tigation was inadequate was the fact that an investigation 
after the trial by the Adult Authority and the district attor-
I) 
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ney's l'itaff turnt'd up additional alibi witnesses that the 
defense had been unable to find. Wllateyer may be the seope 
of the right to au equate and effecti\'e invl'stigatioll, it does 
not require that the investigation produce all evidence that 
can be shown by l1indsight to have been available. . 
[20] Petitioner contends finally that the trial judge erred 
in informing the jury in response to a juror's qUl'stion of 
petitioner's right to an automatic appeal to this court in the 
event that they should impose a death penalty. The trial 
court failed to admonish the jury of their sole responsibility 
for imposing a sentence or to explain to them the nature and 
scope of this court's revie,v. The jury was informed of the 
automatic appeal only after consent of both parties had been 
obtained, ho\"eyer, and this objection was not raised either at 
the trial or on the appeal. 
The order to show cause is discharged and the petition is 
denied. 
Gibson, C. J., Scllauer, J., McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobri-
ner, J., and Peek J., concurred. 
Petitioner's application for a rehearing was denied Decem-
ber 30, 1963. 
